On the security of auditing mechanisms for secure cloud storage by Yu, Yong et al.
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences -
Papers: Part A Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences
2014
On the security of auditing mechanisms for secure
cloud storage
Yong Yu
University of Wollongong, yyong@uow.edu.au
Lei Niu
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
Guomin Yang
University of Wollongong, gyang@uow.edu.au
Yi Mu
University of Wollongong, ymu@uow.edu.au
Willy Susilo
University of Wollongong, wsusilo@uow.edu.au
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
Yu, Y., Niu, L., Yang, G., Mu, Y. & Susilo, W. (2014). On the security of auditing mechanisms for secure cloud storage. Future
Generation Computer Systems: the international journal of grid computing: theory, methods and applications, 30 (1), 127-132.
On the security of auditing mechanisms for secure cloud storage
Abstract
Cloud computing is a novel computing model that enables convenient and on-demand access to a shared pool
of configurable computing resources. Auditing services are highly essential to make sure that the data is
correctly hosted in the cloud. In this paper, we investigate the active adversary attacks in three auditing
mechanisms for shared data in the cloud, including two identity privacy-preserving auditing mechanisms
called Oruta and Knox, and a distributed storage integrity auditing mechanism. We show that these schemes
become insecure when active adversaries are involved in the cloud storage. Specifically, an active adversary can
arbitrarily alter the cloud data without being detected by the auditor in the verification phase. We also propose
a solution to remedy the weakness without sacrificing any desirable features of these mechanisms.
Keywords
secure, cloud, storage, auditing, security, mechanisms
Disciplines
Engineering | Science and Technology Studies
Publication Details
Yu, Y., Niu, L., Yang, G., Mu, Y. & Susilo, W. (2014). On the security of auditing mechanisms for secure cloud
storage. Future Generation Computer Systems: the international journal of grid computing: theory, methods
and applications, 30 (1), 127-132.
This journal article is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/1749
On the security of auditing mechanisms for
secure cloud storage
Yong Yu a,b,∗ , Lei Niu a, Guomin Yang b, Yi Mu b, Willy Susilo b
aSchool of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science
and Technology of China, Chengdu, 610054, PR China
bCenter for Computer and Information Security Research, School of Computer
Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW
2522, Australia
Abstract
Cloud computing is a novel computing model that enables convenient and on-
demand access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources. Auditing ser-
vices are highly essential to make sure that the data is correctly hosted in the
cloud. In this paper, we investigate the active adversary attacks in three auditing
mechanisms for shared data in the cloud, including two identity privacy-preserving
auditing mechanisms called Oruta and Knox, and a distributed storage integrity
auditing mechanism. We show that these schemes become insecure when active
adversaries are involved in the cloud storage. Specifically, an active adversary can
arbitrarily alter the cloud data without being detected by the auditor in the verifi-
cation phase. We also propose a solution to remedy the weakness without sacrificing
any desirable features of these mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
Cloud storage, an important service of cloud computing, allows users to move
data from their local storage systems to the cloud and enjoy the on-demand
high quality cloud services. It offers great convenience to users since they
do not have to care about the complexities of direct hardware and software
managements. Besides, with cloud storage, data sharing is realized efficiently
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among a large number of users in a group and it becomes a standard feature
in most cloud storage offerings, including Dropbox and Google Docs.
Although cloud storage provides many appealing benefits for users, it also
prompts a number of security issues towards the outsourced data [1, 2]. The
data stored on the cloud is easily be corrupted, modified or deleted due to
hardware failure or human errors, thus, protecting the correctness and in-
tegrity of the data in the cloud is highly essential. To achieve this goal, two
novel approaches called provable data possession (PDP) [3] and proofs of re-
trievability (POR) [6] was proposed. In 2007, Ateniese et al. [3] proposed, for
the first time, the notion of PDP to check the integrity of the data stored at
untrusted servers, and presented a public auditing scheme using RSA-based
homomorphic linear authenticators. They also described a publicly verifiable
scheme, which allows any third party to challenge the server for data posses-
sion. To support dynamic data operations, Ateniese et al. proposed a scalable
PDP [4] based on hash function and symmetric key encryption. However, in
this scheme, the numbers of update and challenge are limited and need to
be perfixed and block insertion is not allowed. Subsequently, Erway et al. de-
veloped two dynamic PDP protocols [5] based on hash trees. Juels et al. [6]
proposed a POR model to ensure both data possession and retrievability. Un-
fortunately, this mechanism prevents efficient extension for updating data.
Shacham and Waters [7] described two solutions for ensuring the integrity
of remote data. The first scheme makes use of pseudorandom functions and
supports private auditing, while the second one allows public auditing and is
based on BLS short signature [8]. Based on the BLS short signature, Wang
et al. [15] presented data integrity checking approaches to achieve public au-
ditability, storage correctness, privacy-preserving, batch auditing, lightweight,
dynamic data support and error location and recovery. Since then, several
other auditing mechanisms such as [10–14] have been proposed for protecting
the integrity of the outsourced data.
Most of the existing solutions only focus on auditing the integrity of the re-
mote data. However, privacy preserving is highly essential during the auditing
process. Wang et al. [9] proposed a privacy-preserving public auditing mech-
anism, in which the content of users’ data is not disclosed to the auditor.
Recently, Wang et al. observed that preserving identity privacy from the au-
ditor during the auditing process is also essential since the identities of users
may indicate that a particular user in the group or a special block in the shared
data is a more valuable target than others. They also proposed two identity
privacy-preserving auditing mechanisms, called Oruta [16] and Knox [17], for
secure cloud storage. In Oruta, ring signatures [19] based homomorphic au-
thenticators are employed such that the auditor can verify the integrity of the
shared data for a group of users without retrieving the entire data, while the
identity of the user on each block on the shared data is kept confidential from
the auditor. A drawback of Oruta is that the size of the signatures and au-
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diting proofs are linearly increasing with the number of the users in a group.
Moreover, when a new user is added to the group, all the signatures have
to be re-generated. Knox leveraged group signature [20] based homomorphic
authenticators to solve the problem, and also shortened the size of authen-
ticators and the auditing proofs while preserving the properties of identity
privacy-preserving, public auditing and batch auditing.
In this paper, we revisit three auditing mechanisms for secure cloud storage,
including two identity privacy-preserving mechanisms [16,17] and a distributed
storage integrity auditing mechanism [15]. We show that the property of cor-
rectness cannot be achieved when active adversaries are involved in these au-
diting systems. More specifically, an active adversary can arbitrarily tamper
the cloud data and produce a valid auditing response to pass the auditor’s
verification. As a consequence, the adversary can fool the auditor to believe
that the data in the cloud are well-maintained while in fact the data have
been corrupted. We also propose a solution to resolve the weakness in these
schemes.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review some basic knowledge, including the bilinear map
and the system models.
2.1 Bilinear Maps
Let G1, G2 and GT be three multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, g1
and g2 be the generators of G1 and G2. ψ is a computable isomorphism from
G2 to G1, with ψ(g2) = g1. The map e : G1 × G2 → GT is said to be an
admissible bilinear pairing if the following conditions hold true [18].
(1) e is bilinear, i.e. e(g1
a, g2
b) = e(g1, g2)
ab for all a, b ∈ Zp.
(2) e is non-degenerate, i.e. e(g1, g2) = 1GT .
(3) e is efficiently computable.
2.2 Review of the system model
Three participants, namely the cloud server, the third party auditor and users
are involved in a cloud auditing system [16, 17]. The cloud server has ample
storage space and provides data storage and sharing services for users. The
auditor has expertise and capabilities to provide data auditing service based
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Fig. 1. The system model of auditing mechanisms for secure cloud storage
on requests from users, without downloading the entire file. In a general cloud
storage system model, we only consider a client, an auditor and an untrusted
cloud server as shown in Figure 1. While in an identity privacy-preserving
auditing mechanisms for secure cloud storage, there are two types of users
in a group as shown in Figure 2: an original user who is the creator of the
shared data, and a number of group users who can access and modify the data.
When a user wishes to check the integrity of the outsourced data, she sends
an auditing request to the auditor. Upon receiving the request, the auditor
generates an auditing message to the cloud server, and gets an auditing proof
of the data from the server. After verifying the correctness of the proof, the
auditor forwards an auditing report to inform the user the integrity of the
outsourced data.
3 On the security two identity privacy-preserving auditing mech-
anisms
In this section, we briefly review two identity privacy-preserving auditing
mechanisms called Oruta and Knox, and present security analysis of these
auditing mechanism in the presence of active adversaries.
3.1 Review and analysis of Oruta
The shared data M is divided into n blocks, and each block mj is further
split into k sectors, which are elements in Zp. Thus, M can be denoted as
M = {mj,l}j∈[1,n],l∈[1,k]. Three secure hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → Zp and h : G1 → Zp are employed. The global parameters are
(e, ψ, p,G1, G2, GT , g1, g2, H1, H2, h). Let U denote the user group that has d
users.
KenGen: A user ui ∈ U randomly picks xi ∈ Zp as his secret key and com-
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putes the corresponding public key wi = g
xi
2 . The original user also randomly
generates a public aggregate key pak = (η1, · · · , ηk), where ηl for l ∈ [1, k] are
random elements in G1.
SigGen: Given d group members’ public keys (w1, · · · , wd), a block mj =
(mj,1, · · · ,mj,k), the identifier ids and a private key sks for some user us. us
computes a ring signature based homomorphic authenticator of block mj as
follows:
(1) Compute the aggregation of block mj as
βj = H1(idj) ·
k∏
l=1
η
mj ,l
l ∈ G1.
(2) For i = s, randomly pick aj,i ∈ Zp and set σj,i = gaj,i1 . Then compute σj,s =
( βj
ψ(
∏
i =s w
aj,i
i )
)1/xs ∈ G1. The ring signature based homomorphic authenticator
of block mj is σj = (σj,1, · · · , σj,d).
Modify: This algorithm performs the insert, delete, update operations for a
user in the group to modify the j-th block in the shared data. We refer readers
to [16] for the details of these operations.
ProofGen: The auditor first picks a random c-element subset J of [1, n]. For
each j ∈ J , the auditor picks a random yj ∈ Zp and sends an auditing message
{(j, yj)}j∈J to the cloud server.
Upon receiving an auditing message {(j, yj)}j∈J , the cloud server generates a
responding proof for the selected blocks as follows.
(1) Choose a random element rl ∈ Zq, and compute λl = ηrll ∈ G1, for l ∈ [1, k].
(2) Compute μl =
∑
j∈J yjmj,l + rlh(λl) ∈ Zp, for l ∈ [1, k].
(3) Aggregate the signatures as φi =
∏
j∈J σ
yj
j,i, for i ∈ [1, d].
The cloud server sends an auditing proof {λ, μ, φ, {idj}j∈J } to the auditor,
where λ = (λ1, · · · , λk), μ = (μ1, · · · , μk) and φ = (φ1, · · · , φd).
ProofVerify: With the auditing proof {λ, μ, φ, {idj}j∈J }, the auditing mes-
sage {(j, yj)}j∈J , the public aggregate key pak and all the group members’
public keys (pk1, · · · , pkd), the auditor verifies the validity of the proof by
checking the following equation:
e(
∏
j∈J
H1(idj)
yj ·
k∏
l=1
ημll , g2)
?
= (
d∏
i=1
e(φi, wi)) · e(
k∏
l=1
λ
h(λl)
l , g2).
If the equation holds, the auditor outputs 1; Otherwise, outputs 0. And then,
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the auditor forwards the auditing results to the user.
Security analysis of Oruta: As the first identity privacy-preserving public
auditing mechanism for shared data in the cloud, Oruta enjoys many desir-
able properties of a cloud auditing system including correctness, unforgeability,
identity privacy and data privacy, and it can also be extended to support batch
auditing. Informally, correctness means that the auditor is able to correctly de-
tect whether there is any corrupted block in shared data [16]. Regarding the
correctness of the outsourced data, two kinds of threats were considered in
Oruta. First, an adversary may try to corrupt the integrity of shared data and
prevent users from using data correctly. Second, the cloud server may inadver-
tently corrupt or even remove data in its storage due to hardware failures and
human errors. However, below we show that when an active adversary, such
as a bug planted in the software running on the cloud server by a malicious
programmer or a hacker, is involved in the auditing process, Oruta would fail
to achieve the property of correctness. Specifically, the adversary can arbitrar-
ily modify or tamper the outsourced data and fool the auditor to believe the
data are well preserved in the cloud. All the information the adversary has to
know is how the data are modified. The details of this analysis are presented
below.
Assume the adversary modifies each sector mj,l to m
∗
j,l = mj,l + dj,l for
j ∈ [1, n], l ∈ [1, k] and records the values dj,l, i.e., how the shared data
are modified. In the auditing process, the auditor sends the auditing mes-
sage {(j, yj)}j∈J to the cloud server. Upon receiving {(j, yj)}j∈J , the cloud
server honestly executes the auditing mechanism to compute {λ, μ∗, φ}, where
λ = (λ1, · · · , λk), μ∗ = (μ∗1, · · · , μ∗k) and φ = (φ1, · · · , φd) in the following way.
For l ∈ [1, k], the cloud server firstly chooses a random rl ∈ Zq, and then
computes λl = η
rl
l and
μ∗l =
∑
j∈J
yjm
∗
j,l + rlh(λl)
=
∑
j∈J
yj(mj,l + dj,l) + rlh(λl)
=
∑
j∈J
yjmj,l + rlh(λl) +
∑
j∈J
yjdj,l
=μl +
∑
j∈J
yjdj,l.
The cloud server aggregates the signatures as φi =
∏
j∈J σ
yj
j,i, for i ∈ [1, d], and
sends the auditing proof {λ, μ∗, φ, {idj}j∈J } to the auditor.
The adversary intercepts the auditing proof {λ, μ∗, φ, {idj}j∈J } from the cloud
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server to the auditor, and modifies each μ∗l to
μl = μ
∗
l −
∑
j∈J
yjdj,l
for l ∈ [1, k]. By performing such a modification, the adversary derives a
correct proof with respect to the original data blocks mj for {(j, yj)}j∈J ,
and sends it to the auditor. As a result, in ProofVerify phase, the modified
auditing proof can make the equation hold and, thus the auditor believes that
the blocks in shared data are all well-maintained, while the data have been
polluted by the adversary. In this way, the adversary can make Oruta lose
correctness.
3.2 Knox and its security anaylysis
In this section, we briefly review Knox [17], another identity privacy-preserving
auditing mechanism for secure cloud storage based on homomorphic authen-
ticable group signature (HAGS) [17]. We show that it also fails to meet the
correctness property in the presence of an active adversary and readers are
referred to [17] for the full description of the scheme.
Brief review of Knox: Let M = {mj,l}j∈[1,n],l∈[1,k] denote the outsourced
data and d the number of users in the group. H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → G1 are two cryptographic hash functions. Knox also employs a
pseudo-random generator PRG: Kprg → Zkp and a pseudo-random function
PRF: Kprf ×I → Zp, where Kprg and Kprf are the key spaces of the PRG and
the PRF respectively, and I is the set of all data block identifiers in the index
hash table ofM . The global parameters of Knox are (e, ψ, p,G1, G2, GT , g1, g2, H1, H2,
PRG, PRF).
KeyGen: The original user randomly picks a secret key pair skp = (skprg, skprf ) ∈
Kprg×Kprf which will be shared with the auditor. The group public key gpk =
(g1, g2, h, w, v, w, ρ, η) and the original user’s master key gmsk = (ξ1, ξ2, γ) are
defined as in HAGS [17].
Join: The private key of user i is gsk[i] = (Ai, xi, π, skp), generated as in
HAGS. The original user forwards gsk[i] to user i in a secure manner and logs
the user into the group user list.
Sign: Given a group public key gpk, a private key gsk[i], a block mj ∈ Zkp
and this block’s identifier idj ∈ I, user i computes the signature σj as follows.
(1) Select αj, βj, rj,α, rj,β, rj,x, rj,γ1 , rj,γ2 and compute Tj,1, Tj,2, Tj,3, γj,1, γj,2, Rj,1,
Rj,2, Rj,3, Rj,4, Rj,5 as in HAGS.
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(2) Compute δ = (δ1, · · · , δk) ←PRG(skprg)∈ Zkp and bj ←PRF(skprf , idj) ∈
Zp, then calculate the homomorphic MAC of block mj = (mj,1, · · · ,mj,k)
as:
tj =
∑k
l=1 δl ·mj,l + bj ∈ Zp.
(3) Compute a challenge cj for mj as:
cj = η
tj ·H1(Tj,1, · · · , Rj,5) ∈ Zp.
(4) Compute sj,α, sj,β, sj,x, sj,γ1 , sj,γ2 as in HAGS.
(5) Compute a tag θj as θj = [H2(idj)g
tj
1 ]
π ∈ G1.
(6) Output a signature σj of this blockmj as σj = (Tj,1, Tj,2, Tj,3, θj, Rj,3, cj, sj,α,
sj,β, sj,x, sj,γ1 , sj,γ2).
ProofGen: The auditor firstly picks a random c-element subset J of set [1, n].
For j ∈ J , the auditor picks a random yj ∈ Zp and sends an auditing message
{(j, yj)}j∈J to the cloud server. Upon receiving {(j, yj)}j∈J , the cloud server
generates a proof for the selected blocks as follows.
(1) Compute μl =
∑
j∈J yjmj,l ∈ Zp, for l ∈ [1, k], and aggregate the selected
tags as Θ =
∏
j∈J θ
yj
j ∈ G1.
(2) Output Φ and φj = (Tj,1, Tj,2, Tj,3, Rj,3, cj, sj,α, sj,β, sj,x, sj,γ1 , sj,γ2) based
on σj, where j ∈ J and Φ is the set of all φj.
(3) Generate an auditing proof {μ,Θ,Φ, {idj}j∈J }, and send it to the auditor,
where μ = (μ1, · · · , μk).
ProofVerify: Given an auditing proof {μ,Θ,Φ, {idj}j∈J }, an auditing mes-
sage {(j, yj)}j∈J , a group public key gpk, a secret key pair skp, the auditor
verifies the correctness of this proof as follows.
(1) Generate δ = (δ1, · · · , δk) ←PRG(skprg)∈ Zkp and bj ←PRF(skprf, idj) ∈
Zp, where j ∈ J .
(2) Re-compute Rj,1, Rj,2, Rj,4, Rj,5 as in HAGS.
(3) Compute λ =
∑k
l=1 δlμl +
∑
j∈J yjbj ∈ Zp.
(4) Check the following equations:
∏
j∈J R
yj
j,3
?
=
e(
∏
j∈J (T
sj,x
j,3 · h−sj,γ1−sj,γ2 · g−cj1 )yj , g2) · e(
∏
j∈J (h−sj,α−sj,β · T cjj,3)yj , w).
∏
j∈J c
yj
j
?
= ηλ ·∏j∈J H1(Tj,1, · · · , Rj,5)yj .
e(Θ, g2)
?
= e(
∏
j∈J H2(idj)yj · gλ1 , ρ).
If all the equations hold, the auditor outputs 1; Otherwise, outputs 0.
The auditor then forwards the auditing result to the user.
Open: Given a block mj and a signature σ, the original user can reveal the
identity of the signer on this block using his private key gmsk as in HAGS.
Security analysis of Knox: Similar to the analysis for Oruta, we show
that Knox is also vulnerable to the pollution attacks from active adversaries,
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who can tamper the outsourced data without being detected by the auditor.
Assume the adversary modifies each element mj,l to m
∗
j,l = mj,l + dj,l for
j ∈ [1, n], l ∈ [1, k] and records the modifications dj,l. In the auditing process,
after receiving the auditing message {(j, yj)}j∈J from the auditor, the cloud
server firstly computes μ∗l for l ∈ [1, k] as follows,
μ∗l =
∑
j∈J yj(mj,l + dj,l) = μl +
∑
j∈J yjdj,l,
and Θ =
∏
j∈J θ
yj
j . Then it sends the auditing proof {μ∗,Θ,Φ, {idj}j∈J , }
back to the auditor, in which μ∗ = (μ∗1, · · · , μ∗k) and Φ is the set of all
φj=(Tj,1, Tj,2, Tj,3, Rj,3, cj, sj,α, sj,β, sj,x, sj,γ1 , sj,γ2), for j ∈ J .
The adversary intercepts the auditing proof {μ∗,Θ,Φ, {idj}j∈J , } and modifies
each μ∗l to μl = μ
∗
l −
∑
j∈J yjdj,l, for l ∈ [1, k]. By performing such a modifi-
cation, the adversary derives a correct proof with respect to the original data
mj,l for j ∈ J and l ∈ [1, k]. As a consequence, the proof can pass the audit-
ing verification, which makes the auditor believe that the outsoruced data are
well-maintained by the server, while in fact the data have been corrupted.
3.3 A solution to the security issue
We provide a solution to address the security issue in Oruta and Knox by ap-
plying a secure digital signature scheme. Specifically, in Oruta, the KeyGen
algorithm outputs an additional key pair (skS, pkS) for the cloud server. In
the auditing process, before responding the auditing proof {λ, μ, φ, {idj}j∈J }
to the auditor, the server uses its secret key skS to compute a signature Σ
for the proof and sends {λ, μ, φ, {idj}j∈J ,Σ} as the response to the challenge.
Upon receiving the response, the auditor first verifies whether the signature
Σ is valid or not. If it is valid, the auditor performs the ProofVerify proto-
col; Otherwise, the auditor discards the response. The same solution can be
applied to Knox. In the improved versions of Oruta and Knox, it is hard for
an adversary to modify the auditing proof any more in the auditing process
because of the employment of the digital signatures. Therefore, if the shared
data have been modified, the auditor must be able to detect it. Moreover, since
only a digital signature is introduced in the auditing process, all the merits of
Oruta and Knox are still preserved.
4 Security discussions on a distributed storage auditing mechanism
In this section, we review the distributed storage integrity auditing mechanism
in [15], and discuss its security in the context of active adversaries. Some
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notions are as follows.
• F: The data file to be stored. F can be denoted as a matrix of m equal-sized
data vectors, each consisting of l blocks.
• A: The dispersal matrix used for Reed-Solomon coding.
• G: The encoded file matrix, which includes a set of n = m+k vectors, each
consisting of l blocks.
• fkey(·): The pseudorandom function (PRF), which is defined as f : {0, 1}∗×
key → GF (2p).
• φkey(·): The pseudorandom permutation (PRP), which is defined as φ :
{0, 1}log2(l) × key → {0, 1}log2(l).
• ver : A version number bound with the index for individual blocks, which
records the times the block has been modified.
• sverij : The seed for PRF, which depends on the file name, block index i, the
server position j as well as the optional block version number ver.
4.1 Review of the Scheme
The main scheme in [15] is composed of the following three algorithms.
File Distribution Preparation: Let F=(F1, F2, · · · , Fm) and Fi = (f1i, f2i, · · · , fli)T , (i ∈
1, · · · ,m). T denotes that each Fi is represented as a column vector, and l de-
notes data vector size in blocks. The information dispersal matrix A, derived
from an m× (m+ k) Vandermonde matrix:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1
β1 β2 · · · βm βm+1 · · · βn
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
βm−11 β
m−1
2 · · · βm−1m βm−1m+1 · · · βm−1n
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Where βj(j ∈ 1, · · · , n) are the distinct elements randomly picked fromGF (2w).
After a sequence of elementary row transformations, the desired matrix A can
be written as follows:
A = (I|P) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 · · · 0 p11 · · · p1k
0 1 · · · 0 p21 · · · p2k
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1 pm1 · · · pmk
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
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By multiplying F by A, the user obtains the encoded file:
G=F ·A
=(G(1), G(2), · · · , G(m), G(m+1), · · · , G(n))
= (F1, F2, · · · , Fm, G(m+1), · · · , G(n))
Where G(j) = (g
(j)
1 , g
(j)
2 , · · · , g(j)l )T (j ∈ 1, · · · , n).
Token Precomputation: Suppose the user wants to challenge the server t
times, he has to precompute t verification tokens for each G(j)(j ∈ 1, · · · , n),
using a PRF fkey(·), a PRP φkey(·), a challenge key kchal and a master permu-
tation key KPRP .
For server j, the user generates the ith token as follows:
(1) Derive a random challenge value αi of GF (2
p) by αi = fkchal(i) and a
permutation key k(i)prp based on KPRP .
(2) Compute the set of r randomly-chosen indices {Iq ∈ [1, · · · , l]|1 ≤ q ≤
r},where Iq = φk(i)prp(q).
(3) Calculate the token as v
(j)
i =
∑r
q=1 α
q
i ∗G(j)[Iq],where G(j)[Iq] = g(j)Iq .
Correctness Verification: The ith challenge-response for checking over the
n servers acts as follows:
(1) The user reveals the αi as well as the ith permutation key k
(i)
prp to each
server.
(2) The server storing vector G(j)(j ∈ 1, · · · , n) aggregates those r rows spec-
ified by index k(i)prp into a linear combination
R
(j)
i =
∑r
q=1 α
q
i ∗G(j)[φk(i)prp(q)]
and sends back R
(j)
i (j ∈ 1, · · · , n).
(3) Upon receiving R
(j)
i from all the servers, the user takes away blind values
in R
(j)
i (j ∈ m+ 1, · · · , n) by R(j)i ← R(j)i −
∑r
q=1 fkj(sIq ,j) · αqi , where
Iq = φk(i)prp
(q).
(4) The user verifies whether the received values remain a valid codeword
determined by the secret matrix P:
(R
(1)
i , · · · , R(m)i )·P=(R(m+1)i , · · · , R(n)i ).
If the above equation holds, the challenge is passed. Otherwise, it shows
that among those specified rows, there exist file block corruptions.
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4.2 A Security Discussion on the Scheme
Similar to the analysis for Oruta and Knox, an active adversary A can arbi-
trarily modify the data blocks without knowing the actual data blocks, but at
the same time fool the user to believe that the data are well maintained by
the cloud server. The details are described as follows.
(1) A chooses an l×n matrix Y, whose elements are y(i)q ∈ GF (2p), (1 ≤ q ≤
l, 1 ≤ j ≤ n).
(2) A modifies the data blocks G(j)[φ
k
(i)
prp
(q)] to G(j)[φ
k
(i)
prp
(q)] + y(i)q for 1 ≤
q ≤ r.
(3) In the audit phase, the user and the servers execute the protocol honestly,
that is, the user reveals the αi as well as the ith permutation key k
(i)
prp to
each server and the server computes the response R
(j)′
i (j ∈ 1, · · · , n) and
sends it back to the user, where
R
(j)′
i =
r∑
q=1
αqi ∗ (G(j)[φk(i)prp(q)] + y
(i)
q )
=
r∑
q=1
αqi ∗ (G(j)[φk(i)prp(q)]) +
r∑
q=1
(αqi ∗ y(i)q )
=R
(j)
i +
r∑
q=1
(αqi ∗ y(i)q )
(4) A intercepts the response R(j)′i from the cloud server to the auditor, and
modifies R
(j)′
i to R
(j)
i = R
(j)′
i −
∑r
q=1(α
q
i ∗ y(i)q ) and forwards R(j)i to the
user.
It is easy to check that the verification will be successful. Fortunately, au-
thentication is presumed in [15]. The point-to-point communication channels
between each cloud server and the user is assumed to be authenticated and
reliable. We argue that this is highly essential. Otherwise, the mechanism may
be insecure against an active attack as described above. During the implemen-
tation in reality, the server can employ a secure digital signature to achieve
the goal, as suggested in the previous section.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we revisited three auditing mechanisms for shared data in the
cloud, including two identity privacy-preserving auditing mechanisms and a
distributed storage integrity auditing mechanism. We demonstrate that if the
cloud server does not authenticate its response, an active adversary can launch
12
an attack to violate the storage correctness. Specifically, the adversary can
arbitrarily alter the cloud data without being detected by the auditor in the
verification phase. It seems that this kind of attack was not considered in
the previous proposals, and fortunately, the authors of [15] mentioned that
reliable channels between cloud server and users are required but with no
concrete deployment. We suggested using a secure digital signature scheme
to fix the problem without sacrificing any desirable feature of the original
mechanisms.
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